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Abstract: We investigate the motives and circumstances surrounding outside 
directors' decisions to publicly announce their board resignations. Directors 
who leave “quietly” are in their mid-sixties and professional directors, i.e., 
retirees, who are retiring entirely from professional life. Directors who 
announce their resignation are in their mid-fifties and active professionals. 
Half the time they say they are leaving because they are “busy.” These 
directors leave from firms with some weakness in their performance, but with 
no overt manifestations of cronyism such as excessive compensation of either 
the CEO or directors. The other half of the time directors leave while publicly 
criticizing the firm. These directors are finance professionals who were 
members of the audit and compensation committees. They resign from firms 
with weak boards and financial performance with evidence that managers 
have manipulated earnings upwards. Public criticism appears to pressure 
these boards to make management changes associated with improved stock 
price performance. We conclude that while such public resignations are 
motivated by the reputational concerns of directors, they can act as a 
disciplining device for poor board performance. 
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In this study we examine announcements of outside director 
resignations to provide further insight into the incentives that outside 
directors have in monitoring managers. In their seminal work, Fama 
and Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors are expert decision 
makers and their incentives to monitor management stem from their 
desire to retain their reputation as experts. Outside directors are likely 
to resign publicly when they are no longer able to effectively watch 
over management, for whatever reason, as a way to keep their 
reputations. An investigation into the circumstances of public 
resignations can provide greater understanding into how directors and 
boards function. 
Outside directors are charged to protect shareholders' interests. 
Yet, their ability to do so can be limited. First, meeting only a dozen or 
so times of year, they are unlikely to have the time to familiarize 
themselves sufficiently with the firm's operating and accounting 
practices to uncover and prevent mismanagement before it has gone 
too far. Moreover, they often rely on the same management for the 
information that may reveal their culpability. Second, managers also 
tend to control who serves on the board. Every year, in most firms, 
managers nominate a slate of directors to be elected at the annual 
shareholders' meeting. The nominating process, then, also acts to 
compromise the independence of outside directors. Directors might be 
reluctant to question and thereby lose the support of management. 
Given the above limitations, one of the strongest incentives that 
outside directors have to monitor is to preserve their reputation capital 
and business relationships (see Fama and Jensen, 1983). Prior 
researchers have argued that the value of directors' reputations 
manifests itself in additional board seats and fees, stock, and options 
grants that accompany those appointments (see Yermak, 2004). 
Similarly loss of reputation manifests itself in the loss of board 
appointments (see Fich and Shivdasani, 2007). However, these 
incentives are not wholly consistent with the incentive to maximize 
shareholder wealth. For one thing, outside directors may be more 
concerned with their reputations for cooperating with management 
than as “watch dogs” for shareholders, i.e., directors can be 
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susceptible to cronyism. Specifically, cronyism can manifest itself as 
the exchange of board seats for awarding excessive compensation for 
the CEO or ignoring poor performance. Another thing is that, there are 
likely to be higher time costs associated with discovering 
mismanagement early; the longer mismanagement persists the more 
likely it will be revealed with a minimal amount of the director's time 
spent on discovery. Then, when there is clear and public evidence that 
managers are not acting in shareholders' interests, directors may have 
no choice but to act to discipline managers or they risk losing their 
reputation as independent monitors. However, this makes outside 
directors more of a mechanism of last resort rather than the proactive 
monitors that shareholders wish them to be. For example, boards tend 
to replace the CEO after a period of poor firm performance (see 
Weisbach, 1988) rather than remove the CEO before the damage has 
been done (see Jensen, 1993, for a more complete discussion of the 
failures of internal control systems). 
Furthermore, since most board decisions are by a majority 
consensus, a single director relies on the support of others when 
questioning management (see Mace, 1971). Different directors will 
face different time costs and differing obligations to management 
which can create disagreements between directors about how to fulfill 
their monitoring obligation to shareholders. 
Because of these tensions, board room conflicts can spill outside 
the confines of the board room and into the public press. Outside 
directors can resign when frustrated with a weak and ineffectual 
board, but may go further and publicly criticize management as a 
means of distancing themselves from a poorly performing firm. It is 
also likely that outside directors will publicize their reasons for 
resigning from the board when they are not leaving because of 
conflicts with management. Such statements can preserve their 
reputations for cooperating with management and reassure 
shareholders their leaving is not a sign of hidden trouble. Likewise, 
when outside directors resign publicly, but decline to provide a reason, 
the director may decide to let his or her silence speak for itself. 
These resignations can have consequences for shareholders. 
Directors might offer a “busy” related reason for leaving a board when 
the firm is in trouble, rather than criticizing the firm, because they 
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seek to maintain their reputations as cooperative with management. If 
so, such resignations could be indicative of managerial entrenchment, 
leading to discipline from the external control market. Alternatively, if 
directors, truly leave because they are busy, such resignations can 
improve shareholder wealth by allowing for the appointment of a 
director who can spend more time on board activities. 
Resignations accompanied by public criticism can put pressure 
on the remaining directors to improve firm performance. Or public 
dissension in the board room may suggest that the board will be more 
amenable to a takeover offer. Alternatively, these might be benign 
events. They may be the actions of a lone disgruntled director or 
indicative of a personality clash between the director and the CEO or 
other members of the board. Then again these resignations may be 
viewed negatively by the market but ultimately ineffectual in bringing 
about positive change. Worse yet the firm may lose the monitoring 
benefits of a good director allowing management to become even 
more entrenched.2 
In this study we investigate a sample of 52 outside director 
resignation announcements from 1990 to 2003. We compare our 
sample of public resignations to a random sample of 52 firms where 
outside directors leave the board “quietly,” i.e., with no public 
announcement in the financial press. These samples allow us to 
investigate the circumstances around directors' decisions to publicize 
their resignation independent of the decision to leave the board. We 
find that half the time directors resign stating that they are busy and 
the other half of the time directors announce they are resigning 
because of uncooperative management or for some other problem with 
the firm that is likely to reflect conflict with management. 
Directors who leave “quietly” are more likely to be professional 
directors, i.e., retirees, and significantly older-mid sixties—than 
directors who leave publicly. These directors are more likely to be at 
the end of their professional lives and less likely to feel compelled to 
publicly clarify their reasons for leaving the board as a means of 
preserving their reputation capital. Younger directors have more years 
left in their careers and hence more to lose from a damaged 
reputation. Directors who publicize their resignations are around eight 
to ten years younger than those who leave “quietly.” 
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Directors who resign for “busy” related reasons are more likely 
to be active professionals. The firms that these directors resign from 
have some weakness in performance in the period prior to the 
resignation suggesting that changes in firm performance is putting 
greater demands on directors. We do not find any evidence that either 
the CEO or the directors are excessively compensated in these firms or 
that there is upward manipulation of earnings. Thus we conclude that 
these resignations are not attempts by directors to protect 
management or evidence of cronyism. 
Directors are more likely to resign for “conflict” related reasons 
when the board is weak. These boards are less independent, smaller 
and dominated by a CEO who is also chairman of the board. Consistent 
with their desire to publicly distance themselves from poorly 
performing firms, we find that these directors are more likely to resign 
from firms with recent declines in operating performance and sales. 
They are more likely to be finance professionals and been a member of 
the audit and/or compensation committees. Not surprisingly, “conflict” 
firms have an increase in accounting accruals, indicating that 
management may be manipulating earnings to mask poor 
performance. Given their financial backgrounds and/or their 
membership on the audit committee, it is likely to be more 
embarrassing to have served on the board of a company with 
deteriorating financial performance and questionable accounting 
practices. 
Finally, we find evidence that public criticism of the firm 
pressures the board to make changes. In the six months following 
these announcements we find significantly positive market adjusted 
stock price performance and a higher frequency of internal 
management changes. The overall weight of the evidence suggests 
that outside directors resign for “conflict” related reasons in poorly 
performing firms with weak boards, perhaps to protect their own 
reputation, but that such resignations ultimately are effective in 
improving firm performance. 
The findings of our study contribute to the vast literature on 
board functioning. While there have been previous studies examining 
changes in the board which have investigated the turnover of insiders 
(see Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988); the addition of outsiders (Gilson, 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 16, No. 1 (February 2010): pg. 38-52. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article 
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
6 
 
1990 and Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990); outside director turnover 
simultaneously with a forced CEO turnover (see Farrell and Whidbee, 
2000), the resignation of both inside and outside directors (see Fields 
and Gupta, 2004), the resignations of outsiders prior to poor 
performance (see Brown and Maloney, 1999), and resignations of 
outside directors following disputes (see Agrawal and Chen, 2008), our 
study is designed to specifically investigate the motivations of outside 
directors' decision to publicly criticize the firm as they leave vis-à-vis 
more benign departures. This study shows that self interest is likely to 
motivate directors to make their disagreements public but can also be 
a mechanism for disciplining managers when the board is weak. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes the sample and data. Section 3 documents the types of 
resignation reasons given and the stock price reaction to these 
announcements. Section 4 investigates the characteristics of resigning 
outside directors and the boards that they resign from. Sections 5 and 
6 provide the results of univariate tests of the differences in corporate 
governance characteristics and firm performance for different types of 
resignation announcements. Section 7 reports the results of a 
multivariate regression results for the director's choice to publicize his 
or her resignation. Section 8 documents changes in stock price 
performance and firm activity after the resignation announcements. 
Section 9 concludes the paper with suggestions for future research. 
2. Sample and data 
We construct a sample of director resignations by searching 
both the Wall St. Journal and Lexis/Nexis full text data base from 1990 
to 2003 using various forms of the search words “director” and 
“resign”. This search produced 464 articles of 735 director 
resignations. Using these articles and proxy statements to confirm that 
the director was an outsider, we construct a sample of 290 outside 
director resignations. We classify outsiders as those who are not 
employees, former employees or related to any employees of the firm. 
Outside directors are also those that have no obvious affiliation with 
the firm or management, such as the firm's external legal counsel, 
banker, or a director that has received consulting fees, as disclosed in 
the firm's proxy statement. This sample excludes directors who did not 
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resign but simply let their term expire and/or resignations that were 
not announced in the press. We also exclude events that are 
contaminated with other announcements. 
Fields and Gupta (2004) also construct a sample using a key 
word search of Lexis–Nexis and report a sample of 133 “outsider” 
director resignations between 1990 and 2000. They define “outsider” 
directors as non-employee directors who are not also former 
employees of the firm, relatives of the firm's employees, bankers, 
accountants, consultants, or attorneys of the firm. Thus our initial 
sample of 290 outside director resignations is comparable to that of 
other studies and is likely to represent most if not all announcements. 
An alternative source of director resignations announcements 
are Form 8-Ks. Agrawal and Chen (2008) use 8-Ks to construct a 
sample of 168 director resignations from 1995 to 2006. Under current 
SEC rules firms are required to disclose whether a director resigned 
because a disagreement with management and within 4 days of the 
event. However, these rules were not enacted until 2004.3 Not 
surprisingly, the number of resignations for disputes with management 
in the Agrawal and Chen (2008) sample more than double after 2004 
and over 42% of the observations in their sample occur in 2005 and 
2006. The rules governing Form 8-K filings during our sample period 
require that they be filed between 5 and 15 days after the occurrence 
of certain material events, such as bankruptcy filings, auditor change, 
change in control, and a director resignation. Firms are not required to 
disclose if a director resigned because of a conflict with management. 
Prior studies examining the information content of 8-Ks using a sample 
period prior to 2004 have found that these forms did not provide 
timely information for director resignations (see Carter and Soo, 
1999). Since stock price reactions to the resignation, as well as the 
reason given, are important measures in our study, we focus on 
constructing a sample created from announcements rather than less 
timely and informative SEC filings. 
From our initial sample of announcements of outside directors, 
we require firms to have sufficient data on Compustat so that we can 
investigate changes in firm performance related to director 
resignations. This restriction reduces our sample to seventy-eight 
firms. We lose an additional fourteen firms because of insufficient data 
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in CRSP to calculate stock price reactions to the resignation 
announcement. Finally we lose twelve more firms because of missing 
information on corporate governance characteristics available in proxy 
statements and 10-K filings for the year prior to the resignation year. 
Our final sample consists of 69 director resignations for 52 separate 
announcements for 49 separate firms. 
We also create a comparison sample of instances where outside 
directors leave the firm “quietly.” We initially identify firms that are 
both on Standard and Poor's Execucomp and the IRRC Directors data 
base spanning the 1996–2004 period yielding 2980 firms and 25,622 
unique directors for a total of 14,563 firm years. We identify 1326 firm 
years where an outside director left the board “quietly”, i.e., is not 
included in our announcement sample. Outside directors are those that 
are identified as independent directors by the IRRC database. Our 
requirement that firms have sufficient data on CRSP and Compustat 
eliminates another 123 and 195 firm-years, respectively. Lastly, we 
require that firms have data on blockholdings as provided through the 
WRDS data base and another 453 firm-years are eliminated. The final 
sample of outside director resignations consists of 555 firms. From this 
sample of 555 firms we randomly pick 52 firms. We use the smaller 
sample to facilitate the hand collection of data, for example, the 
classification of director's primary occupations and firm events that 
occur after the resignation. However, by reducing our sample size we 
reduce the power of our tests. We also do not make inferences about 
specific differences in variables across the different types of 
resignations for the general population of outside director resignations. 
Table 1, Panel A, reports the distribution over our sample period 
of the number of resignation announcements from both the initial 
sample and our final sample. This table shows that, while there is 
variation in the frequency of resignation announcements from year to 
year, there is no obvious clustering over time or trends in the 
frequency of resignations for either the larger or reduced sample. The 
number of directors resigning at once range from 1 to 4; the average 
is 1.5 and the median is 1. 
Table 1, Panel B, reports the distribution over our sample period 
of the number of “quiet” resignations from both the initial sample and 
our final sample. Again, there appears to be no obvious clustering over 
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time in the number resignations. Because of the availability of data on 
IRRC (begins in 1996) and WRDS Blockholder data base (ends in 
2001), we have no observations in this sample prior to 1996 (the 
announcement sample has 19 firms) or after 2001 (the announcement 
sample has 11 firms). Because of the small size of the announcement 
sample, we are reluctant to eliminate firms in this sample to match the 
time frame of the comparison sample. However, we test whether there 
are any statistically significant differences in the variables used in our 
tests for the announcement sample pre- and post 1995 and pre- and 
post 2001 and find none. 
Our sample is not constructed to identify factors that predict the 
likelihood of a public resignation, i.e., it is not random. However, the 
results reported in Table 1 suggest that public resignations are 
relatively infrequent events. The number of outside resignation 
announcements as a percentage of all outside director turnovers 
meeting our data requirements ranges between 0 and 7.55%. 
“Conflict” related resignations account for roughly half of these public 
resignations and thus are even more infrequent. Yet, most actions that 
discipline management occur infrequently. Faleye (2007) using a 
sample from 1995 to 2002 documents 219 forced CEO turnovers 
among 1483 CEO replacements suggesting that CEO turnovers that 
are discipline related occur 14.77% of the time. For this same sample, 
Faleye (2007) documents 102 proxy contests in a sample of 11,464 
firm years (or annual elections of the board) suggesting that elections 
are contested or used to discipline managers less than 1% of the time. 
Yet, nonetheless proxy contests and forced CEO turnovers are long 
recognized events that are associated with increases in shareholder 
wealth (see Dodd and Warner, 1983 and Weisbach, 1988). We also 
document improvements in firm performance following the 
resignations of outside directors who publicly criticize management. 
Hence, while infrequent, these resignations are another important 
mechanism for disciplining management and improving shareholder 
wealth. 
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3. Reasons given in resignation announcement 
and stock price reaction 
The first place we look in examining directors' motivations for 
publicly resigning is the reason he or she gives in the announcement. 
Table 2 shows the different types of reasons given. The most common 
reason given is other professional commitments (33%), followed by 
uncooperative management (23%). Less frequently, resignations also 
occur in the wake of some type of regulatory investigation, i.e., an 
SEC investigation of the firm's accounting practices, (6%), or company 
poor performance (4%). We also find two incidences of directors 
announcing that they are resigning in connection with a reduction of 
their ownership stake. Because directors are likely to have better 
information than other investors (see Seyhun, 1992 and Noe, 1997), 
we infer that a reduction in an investment in the firm is likely to be a 
negative signal. We also find that health (4%), personal, family 
commitments (6%) or other time commitments (8%) are given as 
reasons. Finally, about 13% of the time no reason is given in the 
announcement. 
We group these reasons into two categories—(1) “Conflict” 
related reasons: uncooperative management; regulatory investigation 
or shareholder lawsuit; ownership stake reduction; company poor 
performance; and unknown; and (2) “Busy” related reasons: health, 
personal, family commitments or other time commitments. Prior to the 
passage of new SEC rule in 2004, companies were not required to 
disclose director's resignation letters; hence many directors followed a 
policy of “what happens in the board room stays in the boardroom.”4 
We find that the decision to announce a resignation without providing 
a reason is viewed negatively by the market; the average two day 
cumulative abnormal return is − 1% (median = − 0.05%). Therefore, 
we group resignation announcements that do not provide a reason 
with “conflict” related reasons. To the extent that the reasons are 
really benign and not “conflict” related we bias our results against 
finding a difference between the two types of announcements. Our 
sample contains 26 announcements for “conflict” related reasons and 
26 announcements for “busy” related reasons (it is coincidental that 
the sample is evenly split between the two categories). While not 
reported in the tables, we find no statistical relation between year and 
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type of reason announced. We use the “conflict” related reasons and 
“busy” related reasons categories along with directors who leave 
“quietly” in the remainder of our tests. Comparing characteristics of 
firms across the three types of resignations allows us to test the 
motivations and consequences of public statements accompanied by a 
resignation, other than the resignation itself. 
Table 3 reports the stock price reaction to the resignation 
announcement depending on the reason given. For “conflict” related 
reasons the one day abnormal return is − 1.17% and the 3-day 
cumulative abnormal return is − 3.10%—both are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. For “busy” related reasons both the one 
day and the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns are positive but not 
statistically different from zero. However, for a larger sample of 109 
resignation announcements for which we have sufficient return data 
the three day cumulative abnormal return for announcements for 
resignations for “busy” related reasons it is + 1.64% and statistically 
significant at the 10% level. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that the 
market reacts positively when directors who they define as busy (three 
or more directorships) leave the board and conclude that busy 
directors are detrimental to firm value. Similarly, we find that the 
market reacts positively when directors leave the board explicitly 
stating that they are busy. This evidence also suggests that “busy” 
related reasons are not given to protect poorly performing managers. 
4. Characteristics of outside directors resigning 
In this section we investigate the characteristics of directors 
who resign for different reasons. We use four categories for our tests 
of types of directors. First, we group executives who are retired from 
their primary profession as “professional” directors. Because these 
directors are retired the time cost associated with monitoring is likely 
to be less, which, in turn, is likely to make them better monitors (see 
Brickley et al., 1994). It is also likely that these directors are less likely 
to resign for “busy” related reasons. Second, we group directors who 
are accountants, commercial bankers, corporate finance officers, 
investment professionals, individual investors, or directors who are 
retired from these professions as “finance professionals” (retired 
finance professionals are excluded from the “professional directors” 
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category). Agrawal and Chadha (2005) provide evidence that 
independent directors with financial expertise are valuable in providing 
oversight of a firm's financial reporting practices. Third, we group 
together all other executives. Finally, all other types of outside 
directors are classified as “other”. This last category includes 
academics, past or current government officials or members of public 
policy commissions, philanthropists, and members of other 
professions, i.e., medical. 
We also collect data on whether outside directors are on the 
audit, compensation or nominating committee. Prior researchers have 
found that outside directors on the audit committee can have an 
influence on the firm's accounting policies (see Xie et al., 2003). We 
collect data on director's stock ownership. We also collect data on CEO 
and director tenure and measure the number of years that the director 
and CEO have served together. Further we create a variable, (CEO 
tenure/Director tenure), as a measure of the CEO's relative power over 
the director; a CEO who has been at the firm longer than a director 
may have more influence over board decisions. All of our data is 
collected using the last proxy statement that is issued prior to the 
resignation announcement date or the year prior to the resignation 
year for the comparison sample using the IRRC data base. 
Table 4 reports our results. We create three sub-samples of 
firms based on the reason given for the resignation—“conflict,” “busy,” 
and “non-public”. We test whether there are differences between 
outside directors who resign and those who stay within each sub-
sample as well as differences in resigning director characteristics 
across the three different sub-samples. We use the myriad of the test 
results reported in Table 4 to develop a profile of the archetypal 
director who resigns for each of the three reasons described below. For 
individual test results, we refer the reader to Table 4. 
Outside directors resigning for “conflict” related reasons are 
active professionals and more likely to have financial backgrounds 
compared to directors resigning for other reasons. They are in their 
mid-fifties suggesting that they still have many years left in their 
careers. In the context of poor firm financial performance, these 
directors have a strong incentive to distance themselves from the firm 
to preserve their reputations as financial experts. They are also more 
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likely to be on the audit and/or compensation committees. Their 
financial expertise coupled with committee membership suggests that 
they also are likely to have both greater knowledge and concern about 
either the company's accounting practices (external reporting or 
internal controls) and/or the company's financial results. Finally, they 
have higher stock ownership. Their higher ownership stake provides 
another reason to be concerned about the financial performance of the 
firm. 
Directors who resign for “busy” related reasons are also in their 
mid-fifties and still active professionals and busy. They are less likely 
to be on the compensation committee. This suggests that these 
directors are less likely to have conflicts with the CEO and CEO 
compensation. It may also be the case that they were not assigned 
committee membership because they were busy. Finally, they have a 
relatively short tenure compared to the CEO. It is possible that the 
director is concerned that a dominant CEO will be problematic in the 
future and decides to leave the board, citing, he or she is too “busy.” 
Alternatively, a dominant CEO may put greater demands on directors 
causing some of them to leave because they are too “busy.” 
Directors who leave “quietly” are more likely to be professional 
directors. These directors are around 65 years old suggesting that they 
are retiring, entirely, from professional life as well as the board. Unlike 
younger outside directors who resign publicly to protect future 
opportunities, if directors who leave “quietly” are retiring, they will not 
be compelled to explain their exit. Additional findings confirm that they 
are retiring entirely from professional life. They have relatively longer 
tenures and have served more years with the CEO, indicating 
retirement after a lengthy period of service on the board. They are less 
likely to be on either the audit or compensation committee. As 
directors approach retirement, the board may remove them from 
committees as part of succession planning. 
5. Corporate governance characteristics 
In this section, we investigate the corporate governance 
characteristics of firms where directors resign for different reasons. We 
test for differences in board characteristics, CEO compensation, and 
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outside ownership across the three sub-samples of firms with different 
types of resignations—“conflict,” “busy,” and “nonpublic.” 
Table 5 reports the frequency of different types of directors and 
their committee membership. Firms with outside directors resigning for 
both “conflict” and “busy” related reasons are less likely to have 
professional directors serving on the board. There are two 
explanations for this finding. Firms that are likely to have directors 
leaving “quietly” are more likely to be firms with director retirements. 
As a result, these firms are likely to have more professional retirees 
serving on their boards to begin with. Alternatively, and more 
importantly, firms with less professional retirees may be less effective 
in fulfilling their monitoring function because of greater time 
constraints faced by most directors on the board. The expectation of 
time spent on board matters might increase for each director serving 
on the board without retired professionals able to shoulder more. 
Hence, directors may be more inclined to resign, stating they are “too 
busy” to serve on these boards. Further, boards made up of 
professionals who have less time to spend on board matters may fail 
to adequately monitor managers and become dysfunctional. Hence, 
directors may be more inclined to resign publicly criticizing the firm. 
Our results on firm performance support the second alternative. 
Committee membership also differs across the three types of 
resignations. Table 5 shows that for firms with public resignations, the 
audit committees have proportionately more finance professionals. 
However, firms with “conflict” related resignations have more insiders 
on this committee where finance professionals are more likely to come 
in conflict with management about accounting policies and the 
financial performance of the firm. The composition of the 
compensation committee provides additional evidence of board 
dysfunction for these firms. For “conflict” firms, this committee has 
proportionately less professional directors, who by virtue of being 
closer to retirement are less beholden to management, and more 
insiders, who have obvious conflicts of interests in serving on this 
committee. This committee composition is likely to be another 
manifestation of a weaker board structure as discussed below. 
Table 6, Panel A, reports other board characteristics. The 
percentage of outside directors on the board and board size are 
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smaller for firms with “conflict” related resignations. Prior researchers 
(see Brickley et al., 1997 and Goyal and Park, 2002) have found 
evidence that suggests that CEO's who are also Chairman of the Board 
are more likely to have greater control over the board so we also 
examine the frequency with which the CEO is also Chairman of the 
Board across the three types of resignations. We find that the CEO is 
more likely to be the chairman of the board for firms where outside 
directors have resigned for “conflict” related reasons. An outside 
director may be pushed to resign in protest when conflicts cannot be 
resolved internally with a CEO who dominates a smaller, less 
independent, board's deliberations. 
Additionally, we investigate whether there are differences in 
total stock ownership held by outside directors and director 
compensation. Higher stock ownership is likely to increase incentives 
for outside directors to monitor and may counter other weak board 
characteristics. Low director compensation could be a source of 
disagreement between directors and management while, higher 
compensation (and stock ownership acquired through grants) could be 
indications of cronyism (see Brick et al., 2006). However, as Table 6, 
Panel A shows, we find no statistically significant differences in these 
variables across firms with different resignation types. 
We also report the percentage of directors who resign for each 
resignation announcement. Table 6, Panel A, shows that, roughly, 
when an outside director resigns for “conflict” related reasons another 
outside director also resigns with him or her suggesting that conflicts 
with management are unlikely to be isolated personal disputes. We 
also find that an insider is less likely to resign when an outside director 
resigns for “busy” related reasons. Changes in business conditions for 
the firm may increase demands on already “busy” directors but also 
may increase advancement opportunities for insiders. In fact, as 
discussed later, we do find an increase in management changes for 
these firms. 
Table 6, Panel B, reports various characteristics of the CEO—
age, tenure, total compensation, incentive compensation, and 
ownership. We scale total compensation by both sales and operating 
income to control for compensation differences related to size and 
operating performance. We find no evidence that the CEO of firms with 
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“conflict” resignations is overpaid. We also never find that a director 
gives excessive CEO compensation as a reason for resigning (we find 
one case in the larger sample of 735 resignations but this 
announcement did not make it into our final sample). Since 
compensation contracts are negotiated in advance, they are less likely 
later to trigger a director's resignation ex post. We also find that CEOs 
of firms with “conflict” resignations have more stock ownership. CEO 
ownership may be another dimension of CEO domination of the board 
for these firms as discussed above. 
Finally, we collect data on outside blockholders. The presence of 
blockholders can put added pressure on firms to perform well (see 
Dahya et al., 2008, Denis and Serrano, 1996 and Peck, 1996). It is 
likely that the absence of a large blockholder is another dimension of 
poor corporate governance for firms with “conflict” related 
resignations. However, Table 6, Panel C, shows that the presence of 
an outside blockholders in firms with resignations for “conflict” related 
reasons is at least as strong as in the other firms. Hence, we conclude 
that the absence of a large blockholder does not explain directors' 
decisions to leave the firm and publicly criticize management. 
6. Firm characteristics 
In this section we test for differences in various measures of 
firm performance between firms with the three types of resignations. 
We exclude fiscal year end data from the year of the resignation 
announcement or the “event” year to avoid contaminating our results 
with changes in firm performance that occur after the director has 
resigned. Resignation announcements can occur throughout the fiscal 
year making it difficult to determine within that year the causal 
relation between fiscal year results and the director resignation. 5 For 
our comparison sample we use the three fiscal years prior to the 
resignation year. Table 6, Panel D, reports the results of these tests. 
Our results show that firms with public resignations are larger 
than firms where directors leave quietly. Larger firms are likely to be 
more closely followed by the financial press and hence report directors' 
reasons for resigning. Hence, we control for size in our multivariate 
tests. We also find differences in that the beta of firms between the 
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three sub-samples and control for beta in all of our subsequent tests. 
Finally we collect data on the frequency of two-digit SIC codes of the 
two types of firms and find over thirty codes are represented with no 
more than five observations represented by any one code in any one 
resignation category (and only one with five). We conclude that 
industry classification is not related to the type of resignation 
announcement. 
We also investigate whether firm performance explains the type 
of resignation. We hypothesize that changes in performance are more 
likely to be triggers for resignations than levels alone. For example, 
suppose we have two firms with the same level of performance. One of 
these is a more profitable firm that had a decline in profits, while the 
other was a less profitable firm that improved. We predict that the 
former firm is more likely to have a director that resigns for a “conflict” 
related reason. 
We collect data on changes in sales and operating income as 
two key measures of performance. Table 6, Panel D, shows that after 
a period of increases in sales and operating performance, both decline 
for firms with “conflict” related resignation during the year prior to the 
resignation. Such conditions can lead to conflict in the boardroom. For 
firms with “busy” related resignations, firm performance remains 
relatively stable while for firm with “quiet” resignations, firm 
performance improves. 
Table 6, Panel D, also reports the results for other measures of 
performance—average annual percentage sales growth in the three 
years prior, operating margins (EBITDA/Sales), and percentage of 
firms reporting a loss, and market adjusted stock price performance 
six and twelve months prior to the resignation year. The overall weight 
of the evidence on all of these performance measures show that firms 
with resignation announcement for “conflict” related reasons have 
poorer performance than firms with either resignation announcements 
for “busy” related reasons or firms with “quiet” resignations. We also 
find that firms with resignations for “busy” related reasons have 
weaker performance than firms with “quiet” resignations. Weak firm 
performance can create greater demands on directors. 
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Finally, we investigate whether there are differences between the 
three types of firms in changes in accounting accruals. Table 6, Panel 
D, shows that firms with “conflict” related resignation announcements 
are more likely to have greater positive changes in accruals. This 
indicates that management may be manipulating accruals to mask 
poor performance creating another source of conflict between directors 
and management.6 
7. Likelihood of resigning for “conflict” related 
reasons 
Table 7 reports the results of a logit regression for the likelihood 
that an outside director resigns publicly for “conflict” or “busy” related 
reasons or leaves “quietly.” We include variables that identify who 
these directors are and what types of firms they resign from. We 
report these multivariate results to confirm our earlier findings. 
The results in Table 7 show that an outside director is more 
likely to resign for “conflict” related reasons when the director is a 
financial professional and a member of the audit or compensation 
committee. Directors are also more likely to resign in protest when 
operating performance is lower and accounting accruals are higher. 
These findings are consistent with our earlier results. 
Our results also show that directors who resign for “busy” 
related reasons are more likely to resign from firms where the CEO 
has greater tenure than they do. As discussed earlier these could be 
indications of either a greater demand on their time or cronyism. The 
regression results are not consistent with findings of cronyism; 
directors are more likely to resign for “busy” related reasons as CEO 
compensation falls. In addition, the results also show that these 
resignations are more likely to occur for firms with smaller, more 
independent boards, where the CEO is less likely to be chairman of 
board. These findings are not consistent with cronyism. 
Table 7 also shows that outside directors are more likely to 
resign for “busy” related reasons when sales growth and operating 
performance are low, but there are recent increases in operating 
profits. It appears that while these firms that have some softening in 
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their financial performance, they also have some indication of future 
improvement. Implementing and monitoring plans for improved 
performance may put greater demands on director's time leading to 
more decisions to leave for “busy” related reasons. 
Table 7 also shows that, consistent with our earlier findings, 
directors are more likely to leave “quietly” when they are older 
professional directors and have not served on either the audit or 
compensation committee. Directors are also more likely to leave 
“quietly” as the CEO compensation increases and firm performance is 
higher and has recently been improving. While the higher level CEO 
compensation might be an indication of entrenchment, this 
interpretation is tempered by the higher level of firm financial 
performance. Finally, in contrast to firms where directors leave for 
“conflict” related reasons, the results in Table 7 show, that in firms 
where directors leave “quietly,” the change in total accruals are 
negative suggesting there is no attempt to manipulate accruals to 
improve financial results. 
8. Changes after the resignation 
In this section we investigate changes in the frequency of firm 
events and shareholder returns after the resignation. Table 8, Panel A 
reports market adjusted shareholder returns for six and twelve months 
following the announcement. Seven firms have less than six months of 
return data. For the months that data is no longer available for these 
firms, their return is replaced with the return on the S&P 500 so that 
the market adjusted performance is zero for these months. All seven 
firms that were delisted have resignation announcements that are 
“conflict” related. Two firms filed for Chapter 11. One firm was delisted 
and litigated by the SEC for overstatement of revenue. Another firm 
was delisted for poor financial performance and at the time of delisting 
was likely to be sold. Two firms were taken over. 
Table 8, Panel A shows that in the six months following 
resignation announcements for “conflict” related reasons both the 
average and median market adjusted performance is positive and 
statistically significant. None of the other returns reported are 
statistically significant. These findings support the notion that 
resignations accompanied by public criticism of management can lead 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 16, No. 1 (February 2010): pg. 38-52. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article 
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
20 
 
to improvements in shareholder wealth. It is also possible that the 
improved share price performance for firms with “conflict” related 
resignations represents a reversion to the mean after a period of poor 
share price performance as documented in Table 6, Panel D. 
We collect data on the frequency of events that occur after the 
resignation to further understand the changes that lead to the 
improvements in shareholder wealth. Of the seven firms that were 
delisted as described above, the two with takeovers will increase 
shareholder wealth with the offer of a takeover premium. The reasons 
for the delisting of the other five firms—bankruptcy and SEC 
litigation—are likely to be associated with a decrease shareholder 
wealth. In Panel B of Table 8 we report the frequency of events other 
than those that led to the delisting of the seven firms above—focusing 
on management changes, asset restructuring and control related 
events. We also report “other” types of events, such as SEC 
investigations and miscellaneous lawsuits. However, the frequency of 
these events is too low to be meaningful. 
We find that there is a higher frequency of internal management 
changes, such as changes in the CEO or other top executives for firms 
with “conflict” related resignations. This suggests that remaining board 
members feel pressure to “shake up” management after a director 
leaves while publicly criticizing the firm. There is also an increase in 
the frequency of the adoption of control defenses after directors leave 
for “conflict” reason. Hence, some firms may become further 
entrenched. 
We use a multivariate regression analysis to sort out the various 
scenarios for both share price performance and the likelihood of an 
event. We include both the reasons given by the resigning director, 
resigning director characteristics, the occurrence of other events, 
board characteristics, and performance measures in these regressions. 
We also include a dummy variable indicating whether the firm was 
delisted. Our results are reported in Table 9. The six month market 
adjusted return is statistically significantly higher when a “conflict” 
related reason is given in the resignation announcement after 
controlling for other variables. Table 9 also shows that the likelihood of 
an internal control change increases with “conflict” related 
resignations. Of course, it is possible that outside directors resign 
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because they anticipate these changes. It is also possible that the 
dissenting director was preventing the board from moving forward with 
management changes. Yet, no matter what the director's or the 
boards' motivations, the public criticism is likely to create added 
pressure and in turn increase the likelihood of the board acting. 
We also find that internal management changes increase with 
resignations for “busy” related reasons. Changes in executive positions 
can reflect an increase in the “busyness” for the firm. Our results also 
show internal control change events are less likely when the resigning 
outside director was a member of the compensation committee. This 
may reflect disagreements about compensation, executive changes, 
and, ultimately entrenchment. Finally, Table 9 also reports the results 
of regression of the likelihood of a control defense and shows that the 
parameter estimate for “conflict” related reason is statistically 
insignificant. Thus our findings show that a director resigning in 
protest does not increase managerial entrenchment. 
9. Conclusion 
In this study we investigate a sample of outside director 
resignation announcements from 1990 to 2003. We also investigate a 
comparison sample of firms where an outside director leaves “quietly,” 
i.e., with no public announcement. Outside directors who resign in 
protest are more likely to be finance professionals and so do from 
firms with weak boards and a recent decline in performance. Directors 
who resign claiming they are “too busy” are active professionals who 
are likely, in fact, to be busy. We find no evidence that these directors 
claim they are busy to protect entrenched management. Non public 
resignations appear to be ordinary retirements. We conclude that 
directors resign publicly to protect their professional reputations. Yet, 
resignations for “conflict” related reasons are followed with a higher 
frequency of internal management changes along with positive market 
adjusted returns. The overall weight of the evidence suggests that 
while directors self interest might prompt public criticism of the firm it 
also forces the board to act to improve shareholder wealth. 
Thus this study examines a sample where monitoring has 
failed—directors resign when they feel they can no longer monitor the 
CEO. Our findings provide additional insight into the forces that create 
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an ineffective board. We find that directors resign publicly from firms 
with less professional directors on the board from firms that are 
struggling with performance. This suggests the importance of 
populating boards with professional directors. Future study of these 
directors is needed to clarify their role in board functioning and its 
impact on firm value. 
Our findings also highlight the use of public statements 
criticizing management as another corporate governance mechanism 
available to pressure management to act in shareholders' interests. 
Another example is hedge funds that make critical statements of 
management in the press to both pressure management and to signal 
to other hedge funds to buy shares to provide additional shareholder 
support for either internal change or a takeover.7 Other examples of 
the use of the press as a corporate governance mechanism warrant 
further identification and study. 
Notes 
 ◊ We wish to thank Tina Yang, the referee, for many 
helpful comments and suggestions. Useful comments and 
suggestions were also received on an earlier version of this 
paper at the Midwest Finance Association Meetings Spring 
2007. 
 *Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 414 288 1446; fax: +1 
414 288 5756. 
 E-mail addresses: michael.dewally@marquette.edu (M. 
Dewally), sarah.peck@marquette.edu (S.W. Peck). 
 1 Tel.: +1 414 288 1442; fax: +1 414 288 5756. 
 2 We are grateful to the referee for suggesting this 
alternative hypothesis. 
 3 In August 2004, the SEC made a final rule change to 8-K 
filings (17 CFR PARTS 228, 229, 230, 239, 240 and 249) in 
item 5.02 parts (a)-(b). These changes required disclosure 
of director resignations because of disagreement with 
management. These changes also shortened the time 
period of filing to 4 days within the triggering event. These 
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actions by the SEC speak to the importance of these 
events to shareholders. 
 4 "More Directors Are Breaching the Boardroom Wall of 
Silence," Phyllis Plitch, www.CareerJournal.com, from The 
Wall Street Journal Online. 
 5 Quarterly financial results using expectations models 
that adjust for both seasonal as well as prior performance 
would provide more timely information about firm 
performance and a better test of the relation between 
resignations and firm performance. However, the data 
requirements for these tests would reduce our already 
small sample. Yet, to the extent that we have less precise 
data, the power of our tests are reduced and biased 
against finding a relation. 
 6Admittedly, there are better methodologies available for 
detecting earnings manipulation than changes in total 
accruals alone (see Dechow et al., 1995). These 
methodologies are designed to control for both the firm's 
"normal" accrual generating process as well as changes in 
non-discretionary accruals that are performance related. 
However, these methodologies have greater data 
requirements that would further reduce our already small 
sample. For example, the data requirements for the Jones 
(1991) model would reduce our announcement sample by 
50%. However, we control for changes in performance in 
our multivariate tests of the relation between accrual 
changes and the likelihood of resigning for different 
reasons. This provides some control, albeit a crude one, 
for accrual changes related to performance. 
 7 See "Airing a CEO's laundry," Pierre Paulden, 
Institutional Investor, New York: Jun 2006. pg. 1. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Samples of outside director resignations from 1990 to 2003. 
Panel A: Sample of 52 announcements of 
outside director resignations 
 
Panel B: Random sample of 52 firms with 

















































































1990 58 18 0 – – – – – – 
1991 86 41 6 1.5 – – – – – 
1992 45 8 0 – – – – – – 
1993 75 25 4 1.5 – – – – – 
1994 41 15 4 2.0 – – – – – 
1995 61 31 5 1.8 – – – – – 
1996 41 13 5 1.8 154 95 5.00 10 1.23 
1997 62 30 3 1.7 151 78 3.70 9 1.21 
1998 68 22 8 1.8 159 98 7.55 12 1.09 
1999 35 13 3 1.0 173 96 3.03 8 1.21 
2000 35 6 0 – 177 105 0.00 7 1.13 
2001 22 12 3 1.0 150 83 3.49 6 1.16 
2002 66 35 3 1.0 197 –  – – 
2003 40 21 8 1.1 165 –  – – 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 16, No. 1 (February 2010): pg. 38-52. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article 
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
27 
 
Panel A: Sample of 52 announcements of 
outside director resignations 
 
Panel B: Random sample of 52 firms with 



















































































735 290 52 69 1326 555  52 72 
Notes: Outside directors are not employees, former employees or related to any 
employees of the firm, nor have any obvious affiliation with the firm or management, 
as disclosed in the firm's proxy statement or an independent director as defined by the 
IRRC database. 
Table 2. Stated reasons for resignation on announcement for a sample of 52 







“Conflict” related reasons 
Uncooperative management 12 23% 
Regulatory investigation or 
shareholder lawsuit 
3 6% 
Director's ownership stake reduced 2 4% 
Company poor performance 2 4% 
Unknown 7 13% 
 Sub-total 26 50% 
 
“Busy” related reasons 
Other professional commitments 17 33% 
Time constraint 4 8% 
Family business 3 6% 
Miscellaneous and health problems 2 4% 
 Sub-total 26 50% 
 Total 52 100% 
Notes: Outside directors are not employees, former employees or related to any 
employees of the firm, nor have any obvious affiliation with the firm or management, 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 16, No. 1 (February 2010): pg. 38-52. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article 
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
28 
 
as disclosed in the firm's proxy statement or an independent director as defined by the 
IRRC database. 
Table 3. Stock price reaction to announcement for a sample of 52 



























− 0.202 (52)* 
− 1.19% 
(− 0.918) 





− 0.517 (26)** 
− 3.10% 
(− 2.11) 














F-value 2.15 F-value 2.49 
p-value 0.0861 p-value 0.1211 
Notes: * and ** reflect statistical significance at the 10% level and 5% level 
respectively. 
Abnormal returns are measured as the return minus a market model return. The 
market model is estimated as E(rit) = αit + βit(Rmt). The CRSP (NASDAQ) value-
weighted index is used as the market index for CRSP (NASDAQ) listed firms. The 
regression is estimated using 200 daily returns 120 days prior to the announcement. 
Statistical significance is based on Z statistics calculated according to the standardized 
prediction errors method given in the appendix in Dodd and Warner (1983). 
Outside directors are not employees, former employees or related to any employees of 
the firm, nor have any obvious affiliation with the firm or management, as disclosed in 
the firm's proxy statement or an independent director as defined by the IRRC 
database. 
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Table 4. Characteristics of resigning directors for a sample of 104 firms with 
outside director resignations from 1990–2003 (percentages are of total 
number of directors for each column). 
 

































9.3%***a 8.70 7.7 15.28 37.5 18.8***b 
Financial 
professional 
30.2 21.7 19.2 25.00 19.4 17.6 
Other 
professional 
48.8 56.0 50.0 46.53 33.3 (46.9) 
Other 11.6 13.59 23.1 13.19 9.7 16.7 
Total 43 184 26 144 72 335 
Member of audit 
committee 













55.8 (56) 58.26 
(58)***d 




























of years served 
with CEO 
(median) 
















Notes: *, **, and *** reflect statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Differences in frequencies tested using a chi-square test; differences in 
means tested using a Student's t-test; differences in medians tested using Wilcoxon 
signed rank test. 
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a Denotes the statistical significance of the association between the type of director 
resigning or committee membership and the reason given. 
b Denotes the statistical significance of the association between the resigning and non-
resigning director types and committee membership within each of the three sub-
samples for the reason given for resignation. 
c Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related 
resignations versus all others. 
d Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related 
resignations versus firms with “busy” related resignations. 
e Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related 
resignations versus firms with non-public resignations. 
f Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “busy” related 
resignations versus firms with non-public resignations. 
g Denotes the statistical significance of the difference between resigning directors and 
directors who stay within the same firm. 
Data is collected using the proxy statement prior to the resignation announcement or 
the year prior to the resignation year using the IRRC database. 
Professional directors are executives that have retired from their primary profession. 
Financial professionals include accountants, commercial bankers, corporate finance 
executives, investment professionals, individual investors, commercial bankers, and 
accountants. 
Other professionals include corporate executives, lawyers, and consultants. 
Others include academics, past or current government officials or members of public 
policy commissions, philanthropists, or members of other professions. 
Stock ownership is defined as all beneficially owned stock, including options 
exercisable within six months and stock held by family members that the board 
member disclaims any beneficial interest in. 
Outside directors are not employees, former employees or related to any employees of 
the firm, nor have any obvious affiliation with the firm or management, as disclosed in 
the firm's proxy statement or an independent director as defined by the IRRC 
database. 
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Table 5. Characteristics of boards for a sample of 104 firms with outside 
director resignations from 1990–2003 (percentages are of total number of 
directors for each column). 
 
 




Firms with outside 
directors resigning 
for “busy” related 
reasons 
Firms with outside 






5.85% 9.96 17.05***a 
Financial 
professional 
15.50 17.01 13.83 
Other 
professional 
36.55 32.78 34.28 
Other 8.77 9.96 11.93 
Insider 33.33 30.29 22.92 





5.13% 17.20 25.84***a 
Financial 
professional 
29.91 30.11 15.17 
Other 
professional 
45.30 35.48 44.94 
Other 9.40 17.20 11.80 
Insider 10.26 0.00 2.25 





6.56% 20.22 23.12***a 
Financial 
professional 
21.31 31.46 14.45 
Other 
professional 
51.64 37.08 49.71 
Other 9.02 8.99 11.56 
Insider 11.48 2.25 1.16 





8.70% 13.21 23.40 
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Firms with outside 
directors resigning 
for “busy” related 
reasons 
Firms with outside 





6.52 15.09 14.18 
Other 
professional 
56.52 33.93 43.26 
Other 13.04 15.09 13.48 
Insider 15.22 22.64 5.67 
Total 46 53 141 
Notes: *, **, and *** reflect statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Differences in frequencies tested using a chi-square test. 
a Denotes the statistical significance between the association of director type and 
committee membership and the reason given for the resignation. 
Data is collected using the proxy statement prior to the resignation announcement of 
the year prior to the resignation year in the IRRC database. 
Professional directors are executives that have retired from their primary profession. 
Financial professionals include (both retired and active) accountants, commercial 
bankers, corporate finance executives, investment professionals, individual investors, 
commercial bankers, and accountants. 
Other professionals include corporate executives, lawyers, and consultants. 
Others include academics, past or current government officials or members of public 
policy commissions, philanthropists, or members of other professions. 
Outside directors are not employees, former employees or related to any employees of 
the firm, nor have any obvious affiliation with the firm or management, as disclosed in 
the firm's proxy statement or independent directors as defined by the IRRC database. 
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Table 6. Firm characteristics for a sample of 104 firms with outside director 
resignations from 1990–2003. 
 












leaving with no 
public 
announcement 
Panel A: Board characteristics 
Average percentage of 




72.14 (71.36) 76.73***c 
(78.89)***c 
Board size 8.12***a 
(8.00)***a 
9.46 (8.00)***d 10.15***c 
(10.00)***c 
Percentage of firms 
where CEO is chairman 
of the board 
61.54%⁎a 38.46 ⁎b 40.38 
Average percentage 
stock ownership of all 
outside directors 
(median) 
0.037% (1.21) 5.89 (0.90) 4.73 (0.58) 
Annual retainer fee as 


























Percentage of firms 
where an inside 
director also resigns 
24.48% 14.56 ***b, ***d 30.77 
 
Panel B: CEO characteristics 
Average age (median) 51.12*a (50)*a 53.88 (53) 55.77**c (56)**c 
Average total cash 
compensation as a 
percentage of sales 
(median) 




6.68%*a (2.13)*a 5.19 (0.76) 2.27**c 
(0.59)***c 
Average stock options 
granted as percentage 
of shares outstanding 
(median) 
0.03% (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)***c 
Average total 
compensation as a 
0.80%**a (0.36) 0.47 (0.16) 3.91*c, ***d 
(1.15)***c, ***d 
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leaving with no 
public 
announcement 
percentage of sales 
(median) 
Average total 
compensation as a 
percentage of EBITDA 
(median) 
20.59% (3.07) 4.12 (2.65) 20.88***d 
(9.80)***c, ***d 
Average CEO tenure 
(years) (median) 
7.21 (6.5) 10.58*b (8) 8.27 (6) 
 
Panel C: Outside ownership characteristics 
Average number of 
outside blockholders 
(median) 
2.31 (2) 1.88 (2) 1.67*c (2) 
Average percentage of 
shares outstanding 
held by outside 
blockholders (median) 
13.81% (9.96) 6.87 (7.38)***b 15.62***d 
(13.38) 
 
Panel D: Firm performance 
Average total assets in 
year prior to 
resignation year 
($ millions) (median) 




Average total sales in 
year prior to 
resignation year 
($ millions) (median) 
$ 2911.84 (212.88) 3754.95 (425.36) 764.08**d 
(142.04) 
Average beta in year 
prior to resignation 
year (median) 
0.60*a (0.47)***a 0.90*b (0.91)*b 0.95*c (0.77)*c 
Average change in 
sales from prior 
year/total beginning 
period assets two years 
prior to resignation 
year (median) 
0.18 (0.09) 0.25 (0.21) 0.002***d 
(0.00)***c, ***d 
Average change in 
sales from prior 
year/total beginning 
period assets in year 




0.21 (0.07 )*b 1.78***d, ***c 
(0.95)***c, ***d 
Average change in 
EBITDA from prior 
35.66*a (0.00) 0.61*b 
(− 0.00)***b 
0.00 (0.00)***d 
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period assets two years 
prior to resignation 
year (median) 
Average change in 
EBITDA from prior 
year/total beginning 
period assets in year 
prior to resignation 
year (median) 
− 0.54**a 
(− 0.01)**a, ***e 
0.39 (0.00)*b 0.26**c 
(0.22)***c, *d 
Average EBITDA/total 
beginning period assets 





− 0.03 (0.01) 1.87***c, ***d 
(1.76)***c, ***d 
Average sales/total 
beginning period assets 









growth in the three 
years prior to 
resignation year 
(median) 
15.26% (8.43) 21.01 (12.15) 15.62 (8.00) 
Average operating 





− 0.44 (0.00) 0.18*c (0.16)***c 
Percentage of firms 
reporting a loss 
53.85%***a 38.46 7.69 ***c 
Average change in 
(total 
accruals/beginning 
period sales) in year 








adjusted stock return 
performance six 
months prior to 
resignation (p-value for 








(0.0254) (− 4.92) 
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adjusted stock return 
performance twelve 
months prior to 
resignation (p-value for 
test of difference from 
zero) (median) 
− 40.44***a 






Notes: *, **, and *** reflect statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Differences in frequencies tested using a chi-square test; differences in 
means tested using a Student's t-test; differences in medians tested using Wilcoxon 
signed rank test. 
a Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related 
resignations versus all others. 
b Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related 
resignations versus firms with “busy” related resignations. 
c Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related 
resignations versus firms with non-public resignations. 
d Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “busy” related 
resignations versus firms with non-public resignations. 
e Denotes the statistical significance of differences in changes in performance between 
the two years prior and one year prior to the resignation year for each resignation 
type sub-sample. 
Data is collected using the proxy statement prior to the resignation announcement or 
the year prior to the resignation year in the IRRC data base. 
Stock ownership is defined as all beneficially owned stock, including options 
exercisable within six months and stock held by family members that the board 
member or executive disclaims any beneficial interest in. 
The value of stock options is estimated using Black Scholes. Monthly return volatility is 
estimated using up to 60 months worth of return data in period prior to option grant 
(minimum number of observations used is 44). When time to maturity or average time 
to maturity is missing 10 years is used. When the average exercise price and/or grant 
date is missing, the stock price at the time of grant or at the time the proxy statement 
is prepared is used. 
Outside blockholders are 5% of more beneficial owners of stock with no obvious 
affiliation with management as disclosed in the proxy statement and include insurance 
companies, banks, mutual funds, public and private mutual funds, and investment 
firms. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 16, No. 1 (February 2010): pg. 38-52. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article 
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
37 
 
Outside directors are not employees, former employees or related to any employees of 
the firm, nor have any obvious affiliation with the firm or management, as disclosed in 
the firm's proxy statement or independent directors as defined in the IRRC data base. 
All financial data is measured for first (second, third) full fiscal year end prior to year 
in which resignation is announced. 
Data is collected from Compustat using Research Insight. 
Total accruals are measured as TAt = ΔCAt −  ΔCasht −  ΔCLt + ΔSTDt −  Dept; where 
TA = total accruals; ΔCA = change in current assets; ΔCash = change in cash and 
cash equivalents; ΔCL = change in current liabilities; ΔSTD = change in debt included 
in current liabilities; Dep = Depreciation and amortization expense. 
Differences in changes in performance, EBITDA and Sales, between two years prior 
and one year prior to the resignation year are tested for each type of resignation 
announcements sub-sample. There are no statistically significant differences in year to 
year changes in performance measures for firms with resignations announcements for 
“busy” related reasons or resignations that are non-public or year to year changes in 
sales for firms with resignations announcements for “conflict” related reasons. The 
median change in EBITDA scaled by assets year to year is statistically significantly 
different at the 1% level for firms with resignation announcements for “conflict” 
related reasons. 
Month 1 is the month following the resignation announcements for the announcement 
sample. For the comparison sample, Month 1 is January in the year following the 
resignation year. Monthly returns for each firm in the sample as well as the return on 
S&P 500 are collected starting in the month following the resignation announcement. 
The market-adjusted performance for each firm for each time period is computed as 
the geometric mean of 1 + the firm's performance minus the geometric mean of 
1 + market's performance for 6 or 12 months following the announcement month. To 
limit the influence of outliers on statistical tests market adjusted performance is 
Winsorized at the 5% level. 
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Table 7. Parameter estimates for logistic regression of reason is given with 
resignation for a sample of 104 firms with outside director resignations from 
1990–2003 (p-values in parentheses). 
 
 Likelihood that a 
“conflict” related 




Likelihood that a 
“busy” related 











Intercept − 1.1254 (0.5799) − 2.3155 (0.0334) − 7.5606 
(< 0.0001) 
Director is a 
professional director 
0.3978 (0.5718) 0.0523 (0.8806) 1.4252 (< 0.0001) 
Director is a finance 
professional 
0.8608 (0.0726) 0.0571 (0.8529) 0.3767 (0.3785) 
Age of director − 0.0252 (0.2358) 0.0385 (0.0028) 0.0706 (0.0001) 
Percentage stock 
ownership by director 
− 9.3457 (0.3797) 3.0751 (0.1852) − 2.459 (0.5758) 
CEO tenure/director 
tenure 
0.0221 (0.7527) 0.0996 (0.0019) − 0.0194 (0.7501) 
Director is on audit 
committee 
0.8446 (0.0720) 0.1603 (0.4721) − 0.5748 (0.0739) 
Director is on 
compensation 
committee 
0.9246 (0.0422) 0.094 (0.6787) − 1.3203 (0.0003) 
Director is on 
nominating committee 
− 0.2508 (0.6808) − 0.1179 (0.6360) − 0.2544 (0.4769) 
Board size − 0.067 (0.5628) − 0.1305 (0.0050) − 0.0803 (0.3252) 
Percentage of outside 
directors on the board 
− 0.0128 (0.5239) 0.0469 (< 0.0001) − 0.00285 
(0.8271) 
CEO is chairman of 
the board 




compensation as a 
percentage of sales 
− 0.2758 (0.3625) − 1.9994 
(< 0.0001) 
0.0284 (0.0884) 
Percentage of shares 
outstanding held by 
outside blockholders 
0.0082 (0.7472) − 0.1431 
(< 0.0001) 
0.0199 (0.1083) 
(Change in EBITDA 
from prior 
year) / (total 
beginning period 
assets) 
− 0.1798 (0.4844) 2.566 (< 0.0001) − 0.8081 (0.0813) 
(Change in sales from 
prior year) / (total 
− 0.2489 (0.1998) − 0.4611 
(< 0.0001) 
0.1944 (0.0051) 
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 Likelihood that a 
“conflict” related 




Likelihood that a 
“busy” related 













(EBITDA from prior 
year) / (total 
beginning period 
assets) 
− 0.2499 (0.0901) − 1.2267 
(< 0.0001) 
0.5864 (0.0013) 
Change in (total 
accruals / beginning 
period assets) 
0.8644 (0.0067) − 0.4009 (0.1106) − 1.3265 (0.0007) 
Beta − 0.962 (0.0087) 0.5678 (0.0053) 0.2462 (0.4307) 
Log of total assets 0.0756 (0.6658) − 0.1345 (0.11) 0.0368 (0.7926) 
 
Statistics    
Likelihood ratio / chi-
square 
67.6265 386.3025 153.3482 
Probability > chi-
square 
< 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
N 1111 1111 1111 
For variable definitions see explanatory notes to Table 4 and Table 6. 
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Table 8. Market adjusted return performance and frequency of events in the 
year following the resignation for a sample of 104 firms with outside director 
resignations from 1990–2003 (p-values in parentheses). 
 







Mean Median Mean Median 
Outside director 








resignations for “busy” 
related reasons 







Outside director leaves 
with no public 
announcement 





















Firms with outside 
directors leaving 






61.54% 30.77 **b 67.31% 
Control–
defense 
34.62***a 7.69 *b 5.77% 
Control–
external 




57.69***a 33.33*b 3.85%***c 
Other 15.79 8.00 26.92% 
Notes: *, **, and *** reflect statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
All data measured in year prior to resignation year. For variable definitions see 
explanatory notes to Table 6. 
a Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related 
resignations versus all others. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 16, No. 1 (February 2010): pg. 38-52. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article 
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
41 
 
b Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related 
resignations versus firms with “busy” related resignations. 
c Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related 
resignations versus firms with non-public resignations. 
d Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “busy” related 
resignations versus firms with non-public resignations. 
Monthly returns for each firm in the announcement sample as well as the return on 
S&P 500 are collected starting in the month following the resignation announcement. 
For the comparison sample returns are collected in January of the year following the 
resignation. The market-adjusted performance for each firm for each time period is 
computed as the geometric mean of 1 + the firm's performance minus the geometric 
mean of 1 + market's performance for 6 or 12 months following the announcement 
month. Seven firms have less than 6 months of return data. For months that data is 
no longer available for these firms, their return is replaced with the return on the S&P 
500. To limit the influence of outliers on the statistical test on the difference between 
market adjusted performance between different types of resignation announcements, 
market adjusted performance is Winsorized at the 5% level. 
Asset restructuring includes acquisitions, closing a unit, spin-off, issuance or 
repurchase of equity, or some other type of restructuring events. 
Control defenses include adoption of a poison pill, another anti-takeover amendment, 
or other defensive action. 
Takeover related events include takeover rumors, bids, proxy fights, shareholder 
litigation related to takeover issues, and outside block acquisitions. 
Internal management changes include changes in the CEO or other top executives. 
Other includes miscellaneous lawsuits and investigations by the SEC. 
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Table 9. Regression estimates explaining market adjusted return 
performance and likelihood of events in the year following the resignation for 
a sample of 104 firms with outside director resignations from 1990–2003. 
 

















Intercept − 0.79425 (0.1635) − 6.9626 (0.2056) − 7.1614 
(0.1661) 
“Conflict” related 
reason given for 
resignation 
0.40132 (0.0506) 7.3247 (0.011) 1.3518 (0.4958) 
“Busy” related 
reason given for 
resignation 
− 0.13158 (0.4092) 4.0039 (0.0879) − 0.7292 
(0.6491) 
A resigning outside 
director is a 
professional director 
− 0.18941 (0.1279) − 2.1729 (0.1947) − 0.0915 
(0.9278) 
A resigning outside 
director is a finance 
professional 
− 0.00705 (0.9501) − 1.784 (0.1449) 0.8316 (0.4074) 
A resigning outside 
director is on audit 
committee 
0.11624 (0.2923) 0.6822 (0.5308) − 0.1381 
(0.8932) 
A resigning outside 
director is on 
compensation 
committee 
0.07621 (0.5401) − 3.6106 (0.018) 1.3688 (0.206) 
A resigning outside 
director is on 
nominating 
committee 
− 0.10991 (0.3966) − 0.2725 (0.837) 0.5572 (0.5935) 
Firm is delisted in 
year after 
resignation year 




occurs in year after 
resignation year 
− 0.2471 (0.0201) 1.8047 (0.0729) 0.144 (0.8784) 
An internal 
management 
change event occurs 
in year after 
resignation year 
0.09756 (0.4858) – 0.7501 (0.5242) 
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event occurs in year 
after resignation 
year 
− 0.09346 (0.5171) 1.8302 (0.1377) – 
A control–external 
event occurs in year 
after resignation 
year 
− 0.21504 (0.3645) − 15.5935 (0.9721) 3.2293 (0.0774) 
Another type of 
event occurs in year 
after resignation 
year 
0.08103 (0.5648) 2.5711 (0.0508) 2.2432 (0.0368) 
CEO is chairman of 
the board 
− 0.0253 (0.8054) 0.9407 (0.3811) − 1.2014 
(0.1509) 
Board size 0.00118 (0.9623) 0.2338 (0.2301) − 0.01 (0.9534) 
Percentage of 
outside directors on 
the board 
0.00667 (0.0957) 0.0462 (0.2188) − 0.01 (0.9534) 
CEO's percentage 
stock ownership 
0.00747 (0.3236) 0.0567 (0.3945) − 0.0974 
(0.2327) 
CEO's total 
compensation as a 
percentage of 
EBITDA 
− 0.00108 (0.3162) − 0.00939 (0.2949) − 0.2051 
(0.2985) 
CEO's age 0.0108 (0.1419) − 0.0306 (0.691) 0.0702 (0.2762) 
Percentage of shares 




0.0205 (0.6558) − 0.0185 
(0.5924) 
Six month market 
adjusted 
performance in the 
year prior to 
resignation year 
− 0.04557 (0.7755) – – 
Beta − 0.00142 (0.9851) 0.0149 (0.9865) − 0.6169 (0.346) 
EBITDA/total 
beginning period 
assets in year prior 
to resignation year 
– − 0.5869 (0.4383) − 0.2051 
(0.2985) 
Log of total assets − 0.02909 (0.4697) − 0.4055 (0.2541) 0.403 (0.2236) 
 
Statistics 
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F-stat or likelihood 
ratio / chi-square 
1.52 63.6916 36.2374 
Probability of > F 
or > chi-square 
0.0871 < 0.0001 0.0286 
N 104 104 104 
For variable definitions see explanatory notes to Table 4, Table 6 and Table 8. 
 
 
